1

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE
47TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY

ANTITRUST ECONOMICS WORKSHOPS +
NETWORKING SESSION WITH HEADS OF AUTHORITY
Wednesday, October 7, 2020

Panel 2: Understanding Network Effects in the Platform Context
Moderator:
Mike Cragg
Principal and Chairman of the Board, The Brattle Group
Panelists:
Rosa Abrantes-Metz
New York University, Stern School of Business
Evan Chesler
Chairman, Cravath Swaine & Moore
Lars Kjølbye
Partner, Latham & Watkins
Kai-Uwe Kühn
Academic Advisor, The Brattle Group
* * *
MR. CRAGG:

Welcome to our second panel at

the Fordham Conference.

This panel is about

understanding network effects in a platform context,
and we have both Europeans and Americans who will be
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speaking with us today.

Our speakers are:

Evan Chesler, the Chairman of Cravath, Swaine
& Moore, is probably well known to many of you as

someone who argued the American Express case before
the Supreme Court of the United States.
We also have Kai-Uwe Kühn, who is a
professor of economics, an academic affiliate at The
Brattle Group, and has been at the Commission and
worked with a number of different universities with a
focus on high-tech and network-oriented industries
over the years.
We also have Romy Abrantes-Metz, who just
joined The Brattle Group.

She started her career

working in government and since then she has taught
and has been publishing in the area of network effects
and financial markets and is a well-known testifier in
the area.
Finally, from Europe we have the head of
Latham’s Brussels office, Lars Kjølbye.

Lars has a

distinguished career, having spent the better part of
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a decade with the Commission in various jobs in
Europe, then going

into private practice after that,

where he specializes in the topic that we have at hand
today.
Thank you to everybody who is going to be
speaking today.
We are going to talk about a couple of
different topics.

We are going to talk a little bit

about the existing law, just to set the table here;
then have the economists talk a little bit about
network effects; and then we are going to switch over
to talk about a couple of cases and a couple of topics
which are live today.
I will ask Lars and Evan to tee this up for
us.

I think there is a sense that because of network

effects there is going to be a general inclination to
look to the law that defines single-brand markets.
am curious what you think, from both an American
perspective as well as a European perspective, about
whether that observation is right and what it might

I
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mean.
MR. CHESLER:

From the U.S. perspective, the

network effects issue often, of course, is accompanied
by issues of lock-in, and that immediately causes
people like me to think about single-brand markets and
whether they are applicable or not.
In the United States, the law in that area
was defined and set almost thirty years ago by the
Kodak decision in the Supreme Court, and frankly there
has not been a lot of evolution on the subject since
then.

There have been some lower court cases, but

they have attempted to add more granularity or color
to the Kodak principles of information costs and
switching costs.
The challenge in applying that law to
technology-based markets in the current environment is
substantial because the questions about switching —
for example, information costs — are often affected by
modalities like multihoming.

The law really has not

yet adapted to those new technological facts, so you
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find lawyers like me trying to fit the new technology
facts into the thirty-year-old buckets defined by the
Supreme Court, and that is not always an easy fit.
I think what will happen in the coming years
is that the new facts that are arising in the context
of technology-driven platforms and the network effects
that take place on those platforms is going to cause
the law on single markets to evolve past Kodak to
accommodate phenomena like multihoming and how that
relates to more traditional concepts like information
costs and switching costs.
MR. CRAGG:

That makes sense.

Lars, I am curious what your perspective is
on this, coming from an obviously different legal
regime.
MR. KJØLBYE:

It is actually remarkably

similar in the sense that the single-brand market
cases that we have had are also pretty dated.

They

have all involved, like Kodak, aftermarket situations
where the question was: “Is there a distinct
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aftermarket for services or consumables? Like Kodak,
we had cases involving printers and photocopiers and
whether the ink cartridges for those products were in
a distinct aftermarket.
The analysis that the Commission applied at
the time was basically to ask whether the activity in
question was shielded from competition.
Then, in the case of the aftermarkets, they
looked at primary competition and whether that
constrained the supplier of the ink cartridges in
those cases.

They basically looked at two things: (1)

whether purchasers of those products engaged in
lifecycle pricing; or (2) whether, even if they did
not, when they considered buying a printer they looked
at the cost of the consumables and would switch if
they were too expensive.
While the cases involved traditional
industrial products, I think actually the key question
— namely, whether there is an activity which is
shielded from competition in some shape or form —
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actually remains sound. Then one can apply that also
to more novel situations.
MR. CRAGG:

I am curious.

Would you then

say to a young economist who is trying to be helpful
to you, “Just read these old cases, and you will have
all that you need to know to be useful to me?”
MR. KJØLBYE:

I think you need to think

about how those principles apply to new situations,
obviously.
I do think the big question today is whether
we continue applying traditional antitrust analysis
and look at competition in markets and consumer
welfare or we start applying broader concepts of
fairness.

You look at app stores, and the key

question you ask is: Is there a problem with app store
terms, and to assess that you look at whether the app
developers can go somewhere else; or do you basically
look at those terms in isolation to assess whether
they are fair and reasonable?
From my perspective, unfortunately — we will
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come back to that later when we talk about regulation
— there is a tendency to look at the platform in
isolation and ask the question: “Are these terms fair
and reasonable?”
MR. CRAGG:

I know that Evan’s colleagues

are up to their eyeballs in this topic, so he may
share some insight from that in a little while.
Let me turn to the economics now around what
you have started to speak about.
Romy, one of the things that I notice, and
you may notice also, is that, in general, this term
“network effects” gets thrown around and it is fairly
loosely defined.

Some economists have tried to be

more specific about it.

Do you think it is important

to be specific, be more careful about defining the
network effects, or is it something where a loose
understanding is “good enough” as they say?
MS. ABRANTES-METZ:

I think this is one of

the most critical parts of analyzing one of these
cases, not just for regulation but also for antitrust.
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As an economist who thinks about modeling network
effects in the context of what economists call a
general equilibrium model and try to come up with
implications for the but-for world and implications of
potential regulation this is really critical.

I think

it is easier if I explain this with a couple of
examples.
Let’s think about if I may buy a small
cookie or I may buy a cookie that is four times bigger
than the smaller cookie but it is otherwise the exact
same cookie, so I am just getting more of the exact
same cookie.

That may be good for me if I really like

cookies, but getting more of the same is the typical
way that the economic literature has modeled network
effects.

So the relationship between the size of the

network and the value of the network tends to be a
constant scale, whatever that scale is — double,
triple, etc.
This does not necessarily apply to all of
the cases.

For the conversation that we are having
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today, and even with respect to the recent proposed
steps by the House that came out yesterday, let me
give the example of how modeling this is wrong in
other contexts and the implications it may have for
breaking up companies, for example.
When you have

a cellphone company that has

lots of subscribers, think about the value of the
network as the number of bilateral calls that can be
made.

If we have one person in, there are no calls;

if we have two people in, we have one call; if we have
three people in, we have three calls; if we have four
people in, we have six calls; if we have five people
in, we have ten calls; if we have six people in, we
have fifteen calls.
What is my point here?

In each one of these

I am adding one person, yet the value of the platform
measured by the number of bilateral conversations is
explosively growing.
extreme example.

Of course, this is a very

Not all network effects are this

strong — this is how I have characterized strong

11

network effects — but it has important implications.
If we think about breaking this platform of
six that produces fifteen conversations into two
platforms of three each — not overlapping and not
connecting with each other — then the two platforms of
three, which are the same size as the original big
platform, only produce six conversations rather than
fifteen.

Why?

Because we are losing all the value of

the externality of the strong network effect.
Thinking that this scale may well not be
constant depending on the size of the network, the
relationship between the size of the network and the
value of the network may change with the size of the
network.

This is critical for regulation, but it is

also critical when you think about competition, when
you think about what the critical mass is, how many
platforms may we expect to exist.
few?
small?

Do we have a lot?

Do we have just a

Are they big?

Are they

What is the value of multihoming depending on

the strength of the network effect?

All of these are
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really important.
The more recent economic literature,
including some of my own and others, is trying to
focus more on modeling network effects in this
context, and the implications for regulation are very
important.
MR. CRAGG:

Thanks, Romy.

That is quite

helpful.
I am wondering, Kai-Uwe, in terms of this
question about multihoming that Romy just raised, and,
in terms of that network example, presumably, even if
you had two networks and everybody was multihoming,
you would still have the benefits of going from five
people to six people because they can share bilateral
calls across the two platforms because they can
multihome.
Could you tell us a little bit about how
important this concept of multihoming is and whether
there is a single economic insight that you draw from
it or whether it is a function of market structure?
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PROF. KÜHN:

I am not sure whether it is a

function of market structure.
I think there are two things that are
important about it.

One of them is why are we at all

concerned about multihoming, and I think that comes
back to the discussion of single brands that we have
heard on the legal side.

The second one is why would

we look at multihoming in the network context as
something for analyzing markets or trying to identify
problems.
The first question is: Why are we at all
concerned about multihoming, given that normally with
other products we are not?

Multihoming is something

about me as a person using different services
concurrently, basically.
If I am thinking about buying a car, no one
would ask the question when analyzing the car market
whether we are sufficiently multihoming between
different car brands at the same time.

Basically, I

buy a car that is a relatively durable good for a
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longer period of time; and then I buy a new one, and I
might actually switch, and it might not matter all
that much which brand I was buying before.

At least

it is a situation in which those switching costs do
not seem to be high enough that we might start
thinking about every brand of car as its own monopoly
market.

So the brand market does not come up here.
But I think what is essential here for my

own kind of substitutability, if we are thinking that
these purchase relationships tend to last a very long
time — so we have long-lived durable goods, in a
sense, which a lot of the choices we are making, for
example, about ecosystems seem to be — I actually feel
I am locked in the next time a choice opportunity
comes.

I might buy a new computer, but I already know

in which ecosystem I am going to be because I have
always used this.
I think the reason why multihoming has
become such an important criterion is that we are
thinking we are in markets in which switching costs
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are actually relatively high.

I think that is a

little bit the difference to the old Kodak literature.
It is not just the aftermarket that you can think of —
for example, the applications that I have in a certain
environment of an operating system — but it is also
that once I have that whole environment of the
operating system, I might actually switch to something
else, and then I have to switch devices, I have to
switch operating systems, I have to switch
applications, and so on.

So the very large

complementarity of a lot of different products
actually leads me into a situation where the switching
costs are higher.
Why are we looking at multihoming then?
Because it is to some extent an indication of whether
there are these types of problems there.

If I am

using multiple things at the same time, I can actually
switch between them without incurring those switching
costs because my type of behavior is already organized
around a number of different things.
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I think we can see that then we can
differentiate to what extent actually the networks
effects are all that big.

I think the network effect

— for example, if you are looking at telecoms — was so
big because there was a physical network there that
was connecting us so that you were actually getting
these economies of scale.
But when I am thinking about social networks
and why I am multihoming, it has really — for example,
with texting — very often been something of a
coordination between two people where the other person
told me: “Oh, we are communicating on this, but I like
this other system.
try it?”

Why don’t you download it and we

I download it and we try it.
In that sense, the number of networks that I

am actually using in this has enormously increased,
and there is a whole question of whether that is an
environment in which switching costs really matter or
whether network effects really matter, because I can
be induced to at least partially switch in response to
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something that someone else does.

The coordination

problem of changing a whole complementary environment
is not there to the same extent.
That may be a bit different when we are
thinking about apps in a given environment, where for
me switching that whole environment may be more
difficult or not.

But even there, we are to some

extent multihoming between, say, the Apple
environment, the Windows environment, and the Android
environment.
If you are looking at a lot of markets that
work really well, especially two-sided markets, where
someone on one side of the market already has a large
number of people, they just leverage this into the
other side and then sell to the other side of the
market.

So some of these networks actually are

movable.
I think the question of “can we move, can
others move; do we go all the way to an Uber model
where the drivers are multihoming and the users are
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multihoming?” — those are actually questions where we
need to look at the markets very individually, and
that is why these platforms are so different from case
to case.

It is always very scary that we are now

trying to use one framework for all of these platforms
with network effects, which I think does not
correspond to the reality of these markets.
MR. CRAGG:

Kai-Uwe, am I right that the

extent to which you are protected from monopoly power
in a basic network market relies on you being able to
switch between networks but for a two-sided market
that insight actually changes?
MR. KÜHN:

Yes.

But that is why I said even

in a two-sided market — we have a lot of two-sided
markets where you are getting entry — the question is,
which market are you actually interested in?

I think

the real competition problems are usually in the
monetized side of the market, not in the subsidized
side of the market.
The point, though, is that in the subsidized
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side of the market there is actually a lot of
competition for people.

If you are looking, for

example, at the Tripadvisor model, they already did
something that was very popular, and then they said,
“Hey, we have got all the information to make hotel
and other bookings,” and managed to enter in that way.
I think it is the question of whether you
can separate the network effects on one side and the
other side and how easy that is, because incremental
entry into another market when you already have a
network of a given size on one side of the market can
be pretty easy, and then you are reducing that problem
of a two-sided network effect issue.
So, again, I think there is a difference
there, but there are enormous economies of scope once
you have a network effect established already on one
side.
MR. CRAGG:

Thank you.

Evan, going back to the question that we
started with about what law matters here, and as Kai-
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Uwe and Romy were talking about both multihoming and
networking effects, three of the biggest cases,
obviously, that have happened over the last twenty
years are so involved Microsoft, Netscape, and
American Express.
When you are working with your clients,
especially those who find themselves in a platform
setting, do you find yourself going back to those
cases as kind of the hallmark of how you advise them?
How do you go about developing what is going to
ultimately matter in terms of a legal case, whether it
be a merger or a litigation of some sort?
MR. CHESLER:

The answer is a little bit of

both, I suppose — that is, relying upon those basic
bedrock principles in those cases, but also trying to
anticipate where the law is going to go and where I
want it to go on behalf of whichever client I happen
to be representing.
When we began preparing the defense in the
American Express case, for example, two-sided markets
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was a subject entirely focused upon by economists;,
there were no cases.

People talk about the Times-

Picayune case, but it was kind of a reach to fit that
into the model of a two-sided market as we were
thinking about it.
That was a case where we were looking at
where we wanted to move the law to come out at the end
of the day, as opposed to starting with existing legal
principles and applying the facts of that particular
case to those principles in advising the client.
In the case of the Microsoft issues, I
brought the Netscape case against Microsoft almost
twenty years ago.

There, there was the U.S. case that

had recently been decided, which really did move the
goalposts with respect to considering Section 2 cases.
That is to say that the traditional unity between the
conduct at issue and the market in which that conduct
played out was disrupted by the Microsoft decision.
This concept of taking actions in one market
that are intended to maintain or develop or preserve a
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monopoly in a separate market was a significant
development that has evolved since the U.S. case, and
certainly since the time I brought the Netscape case.
There again you have a new paradigm of
conduct versus market definition, but the cases are
slowly expanding that paradigm and developing
situations in which conduct that does not necessarily
relate to the market in which the defendant possesses
power nevertheless can form the basis for an action.
In some cases, it is moving the law to a
place that does not yet exist, based often upon the
economic literature that is ahead of the lawyers and
ahead of the legal system; and in some cases it is
taking existing jurisprudence like Microsoft and
trying to expand it to apply to facts that have not
been developed yet.
MR. CRAGG:

Lars, in Europe there is some

similarity with the Microsoft Media Player case.
Obviously, one of the biggest differences is the
limitations on those with monopoly power, what they
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are actually able to do with that.

If you could

comment on that, I would be curious how you think of
that in a platform context where paying for
externalities is a big piece of the economics here.
MR. KJØLBYE:

From a European perspective,

the Microsoft Media Player case was the first big case
that involved network effects analysis.

Of course,

the first case was probably also the one where you
found the most clear-cut examples of a two-sided
market with strong indirect network effects, because
the operating system that has the best app environment
attracts the most users, and the operating system that
has the most users attracts the most app developers,
and then you basically get to something which can be a
very virtuous circle if you control that operating
system.
You see that repeated over time later on
with Android, very much the same thing.

In that case,

interestingly, the Microsoft smartphone operating
system, Windows Phone, failed.

Why?

Because they did
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not have a rich app environment and they could not
compete.

I think also from a European perspective it

is a very interesting case.
Coming back to what Kai-Uwe said, I
completely agree with you that you need to look at
this case by case.

Again, Microsoft and the Microsoft

cases are very, very interesting because since the
leading case there in 2004 there have been a couple of
merger cases involving Microsoft that illustrate some
of the points that Kai-Uwe made, which I think are
useful just to complement what you said.
The first one was Microsoft/Skype, where
Microsoft was acquiring Skype, a consumer
communications service.

At the time, Skype had a huge

user base compared to everyone else, about 300
million.

It was back in the days when people were

only just starting to hear that there was such a thing
called WhatsApp, but no one really used it at the
time, so the big player in town was Skype.
You might think that a service with that
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large a user base would be characterized by very
strong network effects.

But the Commission concluded

that that was not the case because when you looked
under the hood, you saw exactly what Kai-Uwe said —
namely, that you had users that used the service to
communicate with a very small number of friends and
family that they knew well, and it was therefore very
easy for them to persuade their family and friends to
move to a competing service or use several services
alongside.
There were some estimates made at the time
that the average user’s personal network was about six
people.

So the 300 million was actually made up of a

huge number of very small personal networks that you
could easily persuade to move — or at least persuade
to multihome — to another service.

It makes Kai-Uwe’s

point very strongly that you do need to look at the
specifics of each model to understand the network
effects.
I also think your point about Tripadvisor is
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a very interesting one.

As you said, that is a

service where you have a two-sided market, and you
would think, Normally wouldn’t the Microsoft approach
apply there?

Yet, you see that there were competing

accommodation and hotel booking platforms that had
been in the market for quite a while when Tripadvisor
entered, so apparently the network effects are not so
strong that they cause markets to tip in favor of one.
Again, the Microsoft case is a good
illustration of what can happen, like in telecoms, if
you have very, very strong network effects, but it
does not mean that whenever you have a company that
has a large user base that you have network effects.
You need to look very carefully at each individual
model and how it works before you decide whether there
is a problem or not.
MR. CRAGG:

Yes, that makes sense.

One of the things that both you and Evan
mentioned is the economics literature, in particular
the importance of the economics literature to the
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development of the law.

One of the things that is a

little bit striking about the American Express case is
it did rely quite heavily on a number of economics
papers.
I wonder, Romy and Kai-Uwe, if you could
perhaps comment on whether those are the right papers
for us going forward, or is there a new literature
that is even more relevant?
Just to set the table there, those papers
tend to be what economists call “partial equilibrium”
papers, so they do not look at the market effects;
they simply look at the actual network owner.

So in

some ways you might think, Well, those are actually
the wrong papers to rely on because they are not
equilibrium papers.
Maybe both of you could give your
perspective on that as economists, and then I would be
curious to hear what Evan and Lars have to follow up
with.
MS. ABRANTES-METZ:

The papers they were
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used in the American Express case addressed the issues
that were relevant to the American Express case.
Those may not necessarily be the relevant issues in
either the same industry or other industries moving
forward.
One of the things, aside from the partial
equilibrium effect that you mentioned, the partial
equilibrium model, is the fact that these are
typically the papers used to assess monopoly pricing.
So if you are looking into a platform case — several
are already ongoing — where the allegation is that
there is a monopoly, and

they potentially also

engaged in some type of illegal conduct — if we think
about the but-for world, is there still going to be
just one platform or two large platforms or two large
platforms and many little platforms, etc.?
We need to calculate the competitive pricing
to have an estimate of what is the critical mass.
need to understand how likely entry is to occur and
whether multihoming would likely also happen.

We
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All of these things need to have a different
kind of modeling, what economists normally call
general equilibrium models, that take into account the
interactions of all of the agents within an entire
system, and that also look into the evolution, the
dynamics, of how would we have reached the new
alternative world if we are in the context of
litigation.
All of these things are critically dependent
on the network effects, not only obviously but very
much so, because very strong network effects make it
less likely that many competitors, especially many
smaller competitors, would be able to successfully
compete.
I think that a new era of literature is
coming through in the last several years that is going
to be better equipped to deal with the issues that I
think are going to be upcoming in the new cases.
MR. CRAGG:

Kai-Uwe, do you have some

thoughts on this question?

30

MR. KÜHN:

I think it is really two things.

The most important question is the use of economics
and the economic literature in the application to
cases.

We have a lot of things where it is coming up

again — which used to be the case but not so much
anymore — where we get a lot of example economics.
You want to get an effect, so you put a couple of
assumptions together and say, “See, you can generate
the effect.”

Typically, now competition authorities

take this and say, “See, we need to do something about
this.”

That is what I find very dangerous.
The person who first warned about this in

terms of applied game theory was John Sutton with a
nice paper called “Explaining Everything, Explaining
Nothing?: Game theoretic models in industrial
economics,” a critique of modern applied game theory,
which was basically saying if you want to generate an
outcome and you can find the assumptions to generate
the outcome.
But what it taught us, and I think where
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economics has so much gone into the individual case
analysis, is that what you need in order to make your
theory relevant is to make sure that the evidence
shows that the assumptions actually hold in that
particular industry.
I think what we are doing at the moment is
very generally talk about things like network effects.
I see this with some concern, for example, in
enforcement in Germany, where people basically say:
“Oh, it is a platform with network effects.
with network effects lead to tipping.

Markets

Given that they

tip, we cannot allow this merger because it would make
them stronger, and therefore tipping would occur
faster.”

That is essentially the argument.
I think that would be very dangerous because

we do have some models in which we have multiple
networks.

There are models that come out with

tipping, for example, but they are typically very
homogeneous.

If you have a homogeneous network and

the main thing you care about is the size of the
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network, you are going to collapse to zero; it is like
Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods, and one
will survive.
What we are seeing is that success in entry
in these markets has a lot to do with product
differentiation.

To the extent that you have

decreasing returns to network size and have
possibilities of product differentiation, you may have
actually much more fragmented markets, but not totally
fragmented, so the scope that you have and so on — for
example, in Amazon — may be a sign of the quality of
the network.
What comes back is that we have a large
literature on endogenous market structure that I think
we have to think about applying to this kind of
context in order to understand what are actually
sustainable market structures, especially for
interventions like trying to break up firms, because
if these structures are endogenous, we are just going
to create the same structure afterwards.

Those are
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the kinds of things we have to think about a little
bit more.
It is not that the tools are not there, but
some of these ideas have not been brought together in
the context of networks.
MR. CRAGG:

It does remind me, Kai-Uwe, that

one of the places where you see enormous innovation
right now is in the fin-tech space, where they are
piggybacking on old networks like the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
network or MasterCard’s or Visa’s network, to a lesser
extent American Express’s network, but all of the
successful entrants are ones that are going after
specific submarkets.

They are differentiating

themselves through their features and through their
pricing for specific customer needs.
Evan, you are obviously someone who has made
very successful use of the economics literature in
recent years.

Perhaps you could comment a little bit

on how you think about the American Express case, what
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the economist papers there stand for, and what doors
are still open as we go forward in both the law and
the economics.
MR. CHESLER:

First, let me say that the

American Express case was an example, as I said
before, where the economics were ahead of the law and
the challenge was to apply the literature in a legal
context, where it is subjected to cross-examination.
Although I greatly respect the academic tradition of
peer review, it is not quite the same thing as a
courtroom cross-examination.

So it was very

challenging to bridge that gap, to make that
conversion.
To your question about where things go from
here in the light of American Express, one place that
is very much an open area to be developed is the
question of price effects.

In the American Express

case, that was fairly straightforward, in the sense
that there was a price charge on the merchant side of
the market for the services provided to merchants and

35

there was a so-called “negative” price on the consumer
side in the form of rewards, and a lot of the
litigation centered on whether the two-sided price had
ever been determined and if there was any evidence of
anticompetitive effect.
But as the American Express two-sided
precedent, if you will, is applied going forward, one
of the places that I think is a very interesting place
where literature is needed is: What do you do when one
side of the market involves data and a not a
quantitative commodity that is relatively easily
subjected to a price analysis?

How do you determine,

for example, what the two-sided price is when the
product on one side of a two-sided market is data that
is not charged for?

How do you then even approach as

a matter of economics and then translate that economic
principle into the legal context?

How do you approach

the question of placing value on both sides of the
market in order to determine whether there has been an
anticompetitive price effect?
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I think that is a place where a lot of
attention is going to be paid in the legal environment
and I suspect is being paid and will be paid in the
context of the literature.
MR. CRAGG:

Obviously, there is a set of

class action cases that have gone forward around data
breaches of exactly the sort that you are speaking to,
Evan.

They are class action cases, and so the first

question is how you certify a class.

That goes

specifically to the question you are asking, Evan:
What is the value of the data?
One approach that has been used is to say,
“Well, we can observe the value of the data in a black
market.”

I am wondering what you guys think of that

as a potential solution to Evan’s question about what
the value of data is.

Is that going to lead to an

understatement of the value or an overstatement of the
value?
MR. KÜHN:
of “What data?”

I think it is really the question

A lot of people would be thinking,
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Oh, you have a zero price; therefore you are paying
with your data.

I think that is wrong because the

two-sided market models tell you that you get a zero
price for other reasons than you giving something up,
which would be data.
But I also think the value of data to one
side of the market is very different from potentially
the value of data to another.
It may actually also not be the same
product.

If a platform company sells its data — to

the extent that they do; very often they do not — but
to the extent that they do, that is already a
structured data set that they have collected and had
to prepare, so there is a different type of product in
that that is actually being sold.
For me, asking that question in terms of
“What is this other product as a price on the zero
side of a market?” is also problematic because the
issue is not so much “What is the value to me of
retaining the data?” but it is the value to me of
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avoiding an externality, that I might actually not
even know what the size is.
I think we might come back to that
discussion.

I think that is much more problematic

because the damage might actually be in a use of the
data that was not even intended by the platform that
is the other side of my transaction but might come up
somewhere later in that chain of the data being used
and being passed on.
I think the problem is even worse than
saying, “There is no price for that.”

Otherwise, you

would say, “Oh, let’s just introduce prices and it is
all good.”

I think there is a far deeper problem that

comes from the measurement of what external effects
could be on me from data being transferred from
someone else and being used.
That is not a solution to the problem, but I
think the problem is deeper than just asking the
question of “What is the value of data to you?”
MR. CRAGG:

Lars, you mentioned the
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Nokia/Microsoft case earlier.

When you look at the

cases that have actually played themselves through
into a regulatory setting or into a legal setting, it
is quite striking how long that plays itself out.

As

we know from yesterday’s congressional report, for
instance, there is a great focus on the handful of
networks that have succeeded.
Do you think there is an overemphasis on the
successful networks, that as you look back at history,
there is either a little bit of evidence or a lot of
evidence that says that some of the concerns about
networks are actually overstated and that Jeff Bezos
might be more right than we think when he says that
before he dies his monopoly is going to go away —
although he does not, I think, use the word
“monopoly.”
MR. KJØLBYE:

I think there is some of that.

If you look back in time, you could say that the
enforcers and the political establishment have been
used to having one very large and powerful tech
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company around.

You started off with, say, IBM, then

you had Microsoft, and then you had Google.

I think

the concern is that at the same time you have now
several large companies and the economy is seen to be
in transformation and digitization is spreading across
the entire economy.
Therefore, I think you get a bit the same
concerns that you had with Microsoft and Windows, that
people are saying, “Well, if Microsoft can integrate
features into Windows without any limitation, where
does it end?”
Now we are seeing that with several large
platforms in parallel, where you would say, “Well, if
there are no limits to how much each of these or
collectively they can spread, they end up being
involved in a large share of the entire economy.”
If you look at it from a European
perspective, for instance, the car industry is one of
the remaining strongholds of European business, and
there is clearly a lot of concern about what happens
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if Google or Apple get into the car and control the
value of the car.

I think what you see now is a

reaction to fear of the unknown, rather than
necessarily having sat down and rationally looked at
what the magnitude of the problem is, if any.

So I

think there is some of that.
MR. CRAGG:

Yes.

I am conscious of time.

We have just a couple of minutes left here, so I will
just make a couple of observations about our panel.
First, I would like to thank them.
very interesting to me.

It is

We had a preparatory meeting

earlier this week or last week, which was equally
engaging.

We could have gone on for hours, I think.
What is quite interesting about that is that

the conversation we had today is not a mirror image of
that conversation; it is quite a different
conversation.

I think the takeaway is, as our experts

are identifying for us here, that these issues require
detailed and careful examination, that it is very much
not a “one size fits all,” and the jurisdictions are
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going to matter a lot.
The other thing that I would take away from
this is what Lars is I think pointing to, which is
that when you look back it creates a fear of the
unknown.

But if you put yourself at the turn of the

century, I think very few people would have predicted
that you would be witnessing essentially a battle of
titans, for instance, between Epic and Apple in the
way that they are now.
I would just note that when you look at
where software markets are evolving and where
technology markets are evolving, there are a couple of
things which I think are worth pointing to.
One is obviously cloud computing is a major
game changer; it is going to change the way we
interface with our data and the devices that we use to
do that.

The other game changer is the transition to

5G and ultimately what that is going to mean for the
backbone and the last mile and how we think about the
relationship between hardware and software.
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The last thing I would have people think
about is, for those of you who have been involved in
venture capital, IPO-stage companies, one of the
things you will notice is that the hottest part of the
market right now is the software-as-a-service model,
which is a transformation of where we were previously.
The other transformation of where we were previously
is the idea of premium software.
As I look forward and ask the question “Do
those past cases give us insight?” — I would say the
cases involve both the economics and the law — “does
it foreshadow where we are headed?”

I would say that

it does not really provide us a strong grounding from
a regulatory perspective.
Prior to the conversations I had with this
crew, I am not sure I would have held those
perspectives in the way I do now.
I just want to say thank you to our
panelists and thank you to our audience.
everybody.

Bye,
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* * *

Closing Remarks
MR. KEYTE:

Thanks, everyone, for a first

very full day of the Fordham Competition Law Institute
Workshops.
Thank you to Edgeworth and Brattle for some
incredibly in-depth economic analysis, which is what
we have always been trying to achieve with the
Economic Workshops.
Thanks also to our Heads of Authority panel.
It is very interesting to get such a broad
perspective, and we will try to figure out how to do
that again even when we are live.
Tomorrow, of course, is a very full day with
a networking breakfast.

Please attend those.

We will

work out the kinks on the Remo platform this
afternoon.

That is with Skadden and Clifford Chance

and in the afternoon with Freshfields.
Then, of course, we have Executive Vice
President Vestager and Assistant Attorney General
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Delrahim, a tech panel, a mergers panel, and a
Fireside Chat with Barry Hawk and Bill Kovacic.
We will see you all tomorrow.
a full day.

Be ready for

There will be opportunities for questions

from the audience in all of the panels as well.
Thank you very much.

